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Abstract 
The paper studies a regional environmental tax reform in a federal state. 
In a model with immobile labour, mobile capital and mobile polluting input in the 
production function, one region increases its pollution taxes and recycles the excess tax 
revenues by lowering either pre-existing distorting labour or capital taxes. This choice 
determines whether the non-environmental efficiency of the regional tax system 
improves or gets worse. Moreover, the regional tax reform changes the level of the 
federal budget through the vertical tax externality effect. We illustrate the magnitude of 
the different effects with simulations for a country with only 2 regions (Belgium) and a 
country with 50 regions (US).  
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This paper studies a regional environmental tax reform in a federal state. The model assesses the 
welfare effects of this policy on both the federal state and the regions. One region increases its 
pollution tax and recycles the excess tax revenues by lowering pre-existing distortionary labour 
or capital taxes. The choice between a labour and a capital tax cut determines whether the non-
environmental efficiency of the regional tax system improves or gets worse. The paper focuses 
on how the change in the regional efficiency affects the welfare in all regions through the federal 
budget (vertical tax externality). 
Our model describes a federal state with N regions. It has one federal government, N regional 
governments, N representative households and N representative firms. The neo-classical 
production function needs three inputs: labour, capital and polluting input. The three input factors 
are subject to both regional taxes and federal taxes. The regional taxes can differ across regions, 
whereas the federal taxes are uniform. The regional governments provide a regional public good. 
The federal government supplies the same level of federal public good in all regions. The N 
regions are small open economies and face fixed world market prices for the perfectly mobile 
capital and the polluting input. The household can optimize its utility by choosing leisure and 
consumption. The three public goods (environment, regional public good and federal public 
good) are exogenous from the household’s perspective. 
The welfare in each region depends on the regional environmental quality, the regional private 
welfare and the regional and federal public goods. We do not allow for interregional labour 
mobility, or for trans-boundary welfare effects of the environment or the regional public goods. 
As the regional tax reform is budget neutral, the level of regional public good does not change. 
The pollution tax increase improves the environmental quality only in the reforming region. 
We find two private welfare effects: the tax burden effect and the tax shifting effect. When a 
region increases the regional pollution tax, its economy uses less polluting input as the marginal 
productivity of the polluting input always equals the world market price. Similarly, the marginal 
productivity of capital equals the fixed world price too and the pollution- poor economy attracts 
less capital. Labour is relatively immobile and the increase of the pollution tax lowers its 
marginal productivity and, hence, the regional wage decreases. The tax incidence falls on the 
immobile labour. The lower output is a first cost. The tax base erosions cause additional costs. 
With an initial regional pollution tax, the region foregoes tax revenues. This second cost is called the tax burden effect and it lowers the private welfare in the reforming region. Non-reforming 
regions remain unaffected. When the reforming region recycles the excess tax revenues, it has the 
choice between cutting the labour tax and the capital tax. This recycling counteracts the decrease 
in capital, labour and polluting demand, but the offsetting effect depends on the choice between 
both. As capital is perfectly mobile, the optimal capital tax is zero. The optimal tax on immobile 
labour is “high”. With initially positive taxes on capital and labour, capital is over-taxed and 
labour is under-taxed. A regional labour tax cut favours the undertaxed factor. The labour tax cut 
slightly counteracts but does not offset the erosion of the capital and pollution. With a positive 
regional capital tax, this capital tax base erosion leads to an additional cost (i.e. the negative tax 
shifting effect). With a labour tax cut, private welfare suffers both from a tax burden effect and a 
negative tax shifting effect. A capital tax cut favours the overtaxed factor. This policy choice 
attracts more capital. It not only counteracts the previous capital decrease but may even 
overcompensate it. If the capital tax base grows, we find a positive tax shifting effect. With a 
capital tax cut, the private welfare consists of the negative tax burden effect and the (positive or 
negative) tax shifting effect. If the positive tax shifting effect exceeds the negative tax burden 
effect, we have a double dividend (i.e. a cleaner environment and a more efficient economy). 
Neither the environmental quality nor the private welfare changes the welfare in the non-
reforming regions. The regional tax reform changes the tax bases of the federal taxes in the 
reforming region. This affects the federal budget and, hence, welfare in all regions (i.e. vertical 
tax externality). The sign of the vertical tax externality depends on the importance of the tax base 
change and the federal tax shares. The total welfare in the reforming region is a trade-off between 
a cleaner environment, the tax burden effect (negative), the tax shifting effect (positive or 
negative) and the vertical tax externality (positive or negative). The welfare of the non-reforming 
regions is only affected through the (positive or negative) vertical tax externality.  
Simulations for both Belgium and US show that private welfare, employment, capital tax base 
and federal budget decrease with a labour tax cut. They increase with a capital tax cut. Regional 
shares in energy taxation are higher in the US. Hence, the negative tax burden is higher and 
private welfare responds worse in the US state. The vertical tax externality has a lower impact as 
the US has more states. Both economies react better when the mobile factors are good substitutes 
rather than bad substitutes. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      1
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Environmental policy has increasingly been confronted with the division of powers 
between different government levels in environmental and fiscal matters. This multi-
level government arises both from decentralization (e.g. Belgium and Spain) and 
cooperation between regions and nations (e.g. Germany, USA, EU).   
      The paper studies a regional marginal environmental tax reform in a federal state. 
One region increases its pollution taxes and recycles the excess tax revenues by 
lowering either pre-existing distorting labour or capital taxes. The model assesses the 
welfare effects on the federal and regional level. The choice between a labour and a 
capital tax cut determines whether the non-environmental efficiency of the regional tax 
system improves or gets worse. The shift in regional efficiency affects the welfare in all 
the regions through an increase or decrease of the federal budget (vertical tax 
externality). We illustrate the previous results with simulations for a country with only 2 
regions (Belgium) and a country with 50 states (US).  
      Our model combines the tax reform literature with the economics of federalism. In 
the early nineties, economists argued that substituting environmental taxes for pre-
existing distorting taxes may yield a “double dividend” i.e. not only a cleaner 
environment but also a less distorting way of revenue raising (for an overview see 
Goulder, 1995). More recent literature on “double dividend” describes under which 
circumstances environmental taxes exacerbate rather than alleviate pre-existing tax 
distortions (see e.g. de Mooij and Bovenberg, 1998). Most literature on federalism 
focuses on the horizontal tax competition between regions with mobile production Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      2
factors (e.g. capital). They show that, only if non-distorting taxes can be used, 
interregional tax competition leads to an optimal level of environmental quality (e.g. 
Oates and Schwab, 1988).  Most of previous work considers the federal government as 
a referee or passive legislator. The active policy role of both federal and regional 
governments is the main difference of this paper with the previous literature. 
2.  MODEL 
2.1.  Structure of the Model 
Each federal state is the result of a unique historical growth process. The competences 
of the government levels differ significantly across federal states. Therefore we use a 
highly stylised model. It describes a federal government, ruling over N regions. The 
regions are small open economies (S.O.E.). They face fixed world prices for perfectly 
mobile commodities. Each region has a regional government, a representative 
household and a representative firm (Figure 1). 
      Both government levels co-occupy the same tax base: labour income ( 
L T ), capital 
(
K T ) , polluting input (
E T ). In each region we find six taxes, namely three regional 
taxes and three federal taxes. The former can differ inter-regionally, whereas the latter 
are uniform across regions. Labour is assumed to be immobile across regions. Capital 
and the polluting input are perfectly mobile. The model distinguishes three types of 
public goods: environmental quality, regional public good and federal public good. The 
federal government supplies a single federal public good in all regions. The regional 
public good and regional environmental quality do not have any transboundary effects. 





      We assume that initially all regions are completely identical. The initial levels of 
production factors and regional taxes are identical across regions. The paper investigates 













Household N Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      3
by applying an environmental tax reform
1. The model is medium-run static as we do not 
include growth or accumulation nor account for short run adjustments. 
Table 1: The Model 
  Firms   
Profits  0( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1 )
LL KK EE
ii F i ii F ii F i YT T W LT T KT T E =−+ + −+ + −+ +   (I.1) 
Production Function  [ ] ,, ii i i Yf L K E ≤   (I.2) 























=+ +   (I.5) 
  Households   
Utility Function  () ,, , , iii i i ii F Uu M Q V C G G =       (I.6) 
Household Budget Constraint 
** S















λ =   (I.9) 
Labour Supply  1
i
Si LV = −   (I.10) 
  Regional Government   
Regional Government Budget Constraint 
LK E
ii i ii ii i GT W LT KT E =+ +   (I.11) 
Regional Labour-Market Equilibrium 
S
ii LL =   (I.12) 
Regional Environmental Quality  () ii M gE =   (I.13) 
Regional Walras Law: Balance of Payments 
** () ( )
i
iii ii ii T o F YCG KK EE G =++ − + − +   (I.14) 
  Federal Government   
Regional Payment to Federal Government 
iL K E
ToF F i i F i F i GT W L T K T E =+ +   (I.15) 








=∑   (I.16) 
Endogenous variables   ,,, , ,, , , , , , ,  o r  
Si L K
F iii iiii i iT o F jj j GY L EK V CLW MG G T T −    
Exogenous variables  
** ,,,,,,,,, a n d   o r  
L KELKE E K L
i i Fi Fi Fi j j j j j j j EKTT TT T T GT T T −−−    
 Market wage rate in region i i W =  
 Labour supply in region i
S
i L =  
Environmental quality in region i i M =
 Private consumption in region i i C =  
 Leisure in region i i V =  
 Output in region i i Y =  
 Labour demand in region i i L =  
Polluting input demand in region i i E =  
 Capital demand in region i i K =  
*  Regional endowment of capital i K =  
*  Regional endowment of polluting input i E =
   
   
Federal public good F G =  
Local public good in region i i G =  
Payment of region i 
          to federal government
i
ToF G =  
Lagrange multiplier of the
       household budget constraint
        in region i
      (= marginal utility of income)
i λ =
 
    
Regional ad-valorem 
        tax on labour income
L
i T =  
Regional ad-valorem 





i T =  
Federal ad-valorem 
        tax on labour income
L
i T =  
Federal ad-valorem 





Fi T =  
 
(a)  Firms 
In every region a representative firm describes firm behaviour. All firms supply a single 
commodity. As we use a constant return to scale production function (I.2) with perfect 
competition, the firm’s profit (I.1) is zero in equilibrium. We distinguish three inputs: 
labour ( i L ), clean capital ( i K ) and polluting input ( i E ). Capital and polluting input are 
                                                       
1 The reforming region is represented by  j .  All regions are represented by  { } 1,..., ,..., Ii N =  and  jI ∈ .  j − represents the N-1 non-
reforming regions with  { } \ j Ij −∈  Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      4
perfectly mobile. The world markets determine their market prices. Normalization sets 
prices of capital, polluting input and output to unity. Labour is immobile across regions. 
Solving the maximization problem gives the implicit demand functions for labour (I.3), 
clean capital (I.4) and polluting input (I.5). 
(b)  Households 
The representative household maximizes a homothetic utility function (I.6), subject to a 
budget constraint (I.7). The available household budget consists of after-tax labour 
income (
i
iS WL ), and the domestic endowments of polluting input (
*
i E ) and capital (
*
i K ). 
Utility contains three public goods, namely, environmental quality ( i M ), regional public 
good ( i G ) and federal public good ( F G ). The household optimizes its utility, chosing 
leisure ( i V ) and consumption ( i C ). The three public goods are exogenously given from 
the household’s perspective. The public goods do not affect private demand for 
consumption and leisure. Hence, the utility function has a weakly separable form. 
Equations (I.8) and (I.9) represent the implicit expressions for labour supply and 
consumption demand. We normalize the time endowment to unity (I.10). 
(c)  Regional Government 
Each regional government provides a regional public good ( i G ). Regional taxes on 
labour (
L
i T ), capital (
K
i T ) and polluting input (
E
i T ) finance the regional budget (I.11). 
One regional government (region  j ) carries out an environmental tax reform. It 
increases the tax on polluting input and recycles the excess tax revenues under 
alternative options, namely, a regional labour tax cut or a regional capital tax cut. The 
reform is budget neutral for the reforming government (i.e.    0 j G = ). The tax reform in 
region  j  is budget neutral for the non-reforming regions too (i.e.    0 j G− = ), as their taxes 
( ,,
L KE
j jj TTT −−− ) and tax bases
2 do not change. 
(d)  Federal Government 
The federal government links the N regions. It provides a unique public good in all 
regions ( F G ). Equations (I.15) and (I.16) show that the federal budget depends on the 
federal taxes on labour (
L
F T ), capital (
K
F T ) and polluting input (
E
F T ). A tax reform in 
                                                       
2 We discuss Small Open Economies with inter-regionally and internationally perfectly mobile capital and polluting input. Their 
supply is infinitely elastic.  Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      5
region  j  changes its tax bases. Hence, given the unchanged federal taxes, the tax reform 
changes the payments of region  j  to the federal government. A regional environmental 
tax reform affects the welfare of all regions, through the federal budget. We say that the 
environmental tax reform in region  j  causes a vertical tax externality to all regions. 
Table 2: Linearized ModelEquation Chapter (Next) Section 1 
  Firms   
Domestic Output          LK E
ii i i ii i YLKE ωω ω =+ +  (II.1) 
Polluting Input Demand             ** * ()
ii i i ii
L KE
ii i i i i EL EK EE EL WT T T εε ε =− + − −   (II.2) 
Capital Demand             ** * ()
ii i i ii
L KE
ii i i i i KL KK KE K LW T TT εε ε =− + − −   (II.3) 
Non-Profit Condition         0( )
L KE LK E
ii i i ii i WT T T ωω ω =+ ++   (II.4) 
  Households   
Household Budget Constraint        (1 )( )
CL L L
i ii ii i F i CL W ωω θ θ =− − +  (II.5) 
Labour Supply     
ii
S
i i LL LW η =   (II.6) 
  Regional Government   
Regional Government Budget Constraint                  ()
L KE GL L LK K K E E E
ii i i i i ii ii i ii i i i i i GW L T K T E T ωθ ω ωθ ωω θ ωω =+ + ++ + +   (II.7) 
Regional Labour-Market Equilibrium    
S
ii LL =   (II.8) 
Regional Environmental Quality     
ii i M E γ =−   (II.9) 
Regional Walras Law: Balance of Payments              (1 ) (1 )
i CG E E E K K K G
ii i ii ToF ii i F i i i F i i T o F i YCG E K G ωω θ θ ω θ θ ωω =++ − − + − − +   (II.10) 
  Federal Government   
Regional Payment to Federal Government                 
iL K E GL L L L L K K K E E E
iF i F i F ToF i ToFi Fi i Fi i i Fi i i Fi i i GL W T K T E T ωθ ω θ ω ω θ ω ω θ ω ω =+ + + + ++   (II.11) 








= ∑  
(II.12) 
Endogenous variables                           
i
ToF ,,,,,,,,, , , , T  o r  T
SL K
iii i i i j j Fi i i j GYL EK LC WMG G π −    
Exogenous variables                     
**
; T0  o r  T 0 ; TTT0 ; TTT0 ; 0 ; G 0
EK L L K E L K E
j j j F iF iF i j j j ii j TK E −−− = = === === = = =    
Parameters 
*
ab ε = Uncompensated direct or indirect price elasticity of factor a 
with respect to the price b  ( ) ,, , iii ab L E K = in the model 
ii LL η = Uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply 
i γ = Elasticity that measures the effect of more  polluting inputs on 
environmental quality 
Taxes 




































































































ω =  
(e)  Labour-Market Equilibria, Environment and Balance of Payments 
Equation (I.12) shows the regional labour market clearing. As we assume labour to be 
immobile across regions, the federal labour market clearing is redundant. Relation (I.13) 
formalizes the inverse relationship between the polluting input demand and the 
environmental quality. The regional Walras law is a combination of the output (I.1), the 
implicit demand function for clean capital (I.4), the household budget constraint (I.7) Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      6
and the regional budget constraint (I.11). The federal Walras Law is a sum of all 
regional Walras Laws and, hence, it is redundant.  
2.2.  Linearization 
Table 2 contains the log-linearized model. Log-linearizing around an initial equilibrium 
is commonly applied for economic analysis of (small) tax reforms
3. As the tax reform is 
budget neutral for the reforming regional government, its regional budget is fixed 
exogenously (   0 j G = ). The domestic endowments for capital and polluting inputs in all 
regions (   
**
0 ii KE == ) are also given exogenously. Relations (II.2) and (II.3) represent the 
factor demand equations for polluting inputs and capital. The elasticities 
*
ab ε  
( ,, , iii ab L K E = ) represent price elasticities of factor demand conditional on employment. 
As empirical evidence suggests a positive uncompensated wage elasticity (
ii L L η ), 
expression (II.6) reveals that a rise in after-tax wage rate ( i W ) boosts employment 
(Hausman, 1985).  
3.  WELFAREEQUATION CHAPTER (NEXT) SECTION 1 
The environmental tax reform of one region affects the welfare in all regions. This 
welfare effect equals the difference between the individual utility before and after the 
policy shock. As in de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998), our welfare measure, the marginal 
excess burden, is defined as the compensating variation divided by the output (eq.(3.2)). 
The compensating variation is the additional transfer that must be provided to the 
household to keep its utility at its initial level after a policy shock. A positive excess 
burden indicates a welfare loss.  
    Equation (3.1) disentangles the welfare change into its factor market distortions. 
The notation for the non-reforming regions reduces to equation (3.6), as their factor 
markets and their payments to the federal level remain unaffected. On the right-hand 
side of (3.1), the first term shows that employment yields a welfare-gain if the pre-
existing taxes on labour are positive. The labour taxes imply a wedge between the 
marginal social benefits of employment and the marginal social opportunity costs. The 
additional production due to more employment, not only compensates workers for 
                                                       
3 All variables are now denoted as    Z , representing  ln dZ or 
dZ
Z
. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      7
giving up their leisure, but also yields public revenues. Similarly, the second term 
shows a wedge between the marginal social benefits and cost of capital demand. Hence, 
capital expansion raises welfare. The third term represents the environmental factor. If 
total taxes on pollution (
E E
j Fj θ θ + ) are larger than the marginal environmental damage 
(
P
Ej θ , eq. (3.3)) then an increase of the polluting input demand leads to a welfare gain. 
The fourth term reflects the effect of the federal public good. If    
j j GG G
F ToF jF j T o F j GG θω ω > , the 
relative increase in the provision of the federal public goods is larger than the increase 
in the tax payments of region j to the federal state. In this case, the welfare of region j 
improves.  
      ()      ( ) ()( ) ()
jj LL L KK K EE P E G G G
jj j FT o F j F j j Fj j j Fj Ej j j Fj ToFj j LK E G G βθ θ ω θ θ ω θ θ θ ωθ ωω   = − + + ++ + −+−    
(3.1)  


























=   (3.4) 
    An alternative notation for marginal excess burden in the reforming region  j  is 
given by (3.5). Equation (3.6) describes the welfare change in the non-reforming 
regions ( j − ). 
 
       
F     (1 )                                        
           private non-environmental     public non-environmental        public environmental
LL L G G P E
j j jF j j j F j E j j j WG E βθ θ ω θ ω θ ω =− −− − + (3.5) 
  
F        
               public non-environmental
GG
jF j j G βθ ω −− − =− (3.6) 
      The alternative notation (eq. (3.5)) consists of three components: the private non-
environmental welfare, the public non-environmental welfare and the public 
environmental welfare. The tax reform in region  j  influences the welfare of the non-
reforming regions through the public non-environmental welfare (eq. (3.6)). The 
regional budget level does not change in none of the regions (  
i=0 G ). 
(a)  Public environmental welfare 
An environmental marginal tax reform typically decreases the use of the polluting input 
factor. The marginal social damage from pollution is represented by equation (3.3). Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      8
(b)  Private non-environmental welfare 
The private non-environmental welfare is related with the efficiency of the tax system 
as a revenue-raising device. An efficient tax system implies a lower tax burden on its 
agents. It boosts the after-tax wages and, hence, welfare. We can distinguish two private 
welfare effects: the tax burden effect and the tax shifting effect.  
Region j increases its regional pollution tax rate. This policy decreases the demand for 
polluting input, as marginal productivity of the polluting input equals world market 
price (i.e. the supply of the polluting input is infinitely elastic). Similarly, the pollution-
poor economy will also attract less capital. Moreover, the pollution-and-capital-poor 
economy decreases the marginal productivity of immobile labour. The wages in region j 
decrease. Equation (3.5) shows that lower wages have a negative impact on the private 
non-environmental welfare. With a pollution tax increase, the marginal productivities of 
capital and the polluting input remain equal to the world market price, but the marginal 
productivity of labour decreases. It is said that the tax incidence falls on the immobile 
factor, labour.  
      On top of this output effect, a pollution tax increase causes two additional costs. 
First, the tax reform leads to a tax base erosion of the polluting input factor. With an 
initial pollution tax, the reforming government loses tax revenues. This is called the tax 
burden effect. Second, we find a similar effect for the capital market. If the tax reform 
erodes the capital tax base, the governments lose capital tax revenues. A negative tax 
shifting effect appears. If, however, the tax reform expands the capital tax base, then a 
positive tax shifting effect appears. 
    The reforming region j carries out a budget neutral environmental tax reform. It 
uses the excess tax revenues to cut regional distorting taxes. It chooses between a 
regional labour tax cut and a regional capital tax cut. Recycling counteracts the decrease 
in capital, labour and polluting demand, but the offsetting effect depends on the tax cut 
choice. As capital is perfectly mobile, the optimal capital tax is zero. The optimal tax on 
labour, however, is positive (as it is relatively immobile). In the real world, with 
positive distorting taxes on labour and capital, one can say that capital is overtaxed and 
labour is undertaxed. 
      A regional labour tax cut favours the undertaxed factor. The labour tax decrease has 
only a limited effect as the labour supply is relatively inelastic. The labour input slightly 
increases, and region j’s economy attracts only slightly more capital and polluting input. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      9
This capital and pollution attraction counteracts but, typically, does not offset the 
erosion of capital and polluting input by the pollution tax increase. With both an initial 
capital tax and an initial pollution tax, the economy of region j both suffers from a 
negative tax shifting effect and a tax burden effect when a pollution tax increase goes 
together with a labour tax cut. The tax burden effect and the negative tax shifting effect 
are the costs for a cleaner environment. These costs lower the regional wages, and, thus 
the private non-environmental welfare. From a non-environmental point of view, the 
explicit labour tax is a more efficient instrument to raise public revenues as it only 
distorts the labour market. The pollution tax not only distorts the labour market but also 
erodes the tax bases for capital and polluting input.  
      If the region j reduces the regional tax on capital, it favours the overtaxed factor. 
The capital tax cut not only counteracts the capital decrease induced by the 
environmental policy, but may even overcompensate it. Thus, the regional capital tax 
base may even grow. If initially the regional capital tax is positive, this growth has a 
positive private welfare effect. A positive tax shifting effect appears. The capital growth 
also attracts polluting input and labour. The polluting input increase counteracts but, 
typically, does not completely offset the tax base erosion caused by the increase of the 
regional pollution tax. The environmental benefit and tax burden remain. The change in 
private non-environmental welfare is positive if the positive tax shifting effect 
dominates the tax burden effect. If a private non-environmental welfare change goes 
together with an improvement in environmental quality, a double dividend appears.       
(c)  Public non- environmental welfare 
The public non-environmental welfare affects both the reforming region j and the 
remaining non-reforming regions (equations (3.5) and (3.6)). The tax reform changes 
the level of the federal budget, as the tax base shifts in the reforming region. Chapter 4 
shows that the magnitude and sign of the public non-environmental welfare depends on 
the initial federal tax rates, the tax burden effect and tax shifting effect. The federal 
government provides a single federal public good. An increase in the federal budget 
benefits all regions. The tax reform in region j leads to a positive vertical tax externality. 
Region j exports a part of its non-environmental welfare gains to the non-reforming 
regions. Similarly, a decrease in the federal budget leads to a negative vertical tax 
externality. The non-reforming regions pay for the environmental quality in region j. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      10
4.  REDUCED-FORM COEFFICIENTS 
In this section, we quantify the welfare effects of the tax reform for the two alternative 
cases: a regional labour tax cut (Table 3) or a capital tax cut (Table 6). Both tables 
represent the reduced-form coefficients for wage, employment, demand for polluting 
input, demand for capital, output, federal budget and consumption. The wage, the 
demand for polluting input and the federal budget correspond with, respectively, the 
private dividend, the environmental dividend and the vertical tax externality in Table 5. 
4.1.  Reducing Labour taxes 
The reduced-form coefficients in Table 3 consist of two general equilibrium elasticities:  
jj E E Γ  and 
jj E K Γ . Table 4 explains the general equilibrium elasticities. The welfare effects 
of Table 3 are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 3: Reduced-form coefficients reducing labour tax:   
L
j T   
 
E




j j L W ∆   ( ) jj jj
E KE
jE E jE K j θ θω −Γ+Γ   (III.1) 
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      In Table 4, equation (IV.1) shows that 
jj E E Γ reflects the consequences on the 
demand for polluting input relative to labour demand caused by a higher price for the 
polluting input (
*
ii E E ε ) and a lower price for labour (
*
ii E L ε ). The higher price for pollution 
induces input substitution away from pollution towards labour. Moreover, output 
declines as the regional tax reform shifts the tax burden from the relatively inelastic 
factor towards the infinitely elastic factor. The negative output effect reinforces the 
substitution effect and the general equilibrium elasticity is unambiguously positive 
(i.e. 0
jj EE Γ> ). A high elasticity expresses a successful regional environmental policy. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      11
From a non-environmental point of view both government levels forego a lot of 
revenues, leading to a tax burden effect.  
     
jj K E Γ  measures the capital/labour ratio due to a higher price of the polluting input 
(
*
ii K E ε ) and a lower price of labour (
*
ii K L ε ) (eq. (IV.9)). In the normal case, the adverse 
output effect dominates the positive substitution effect ( 0
jj KE Γ >  and  0
jj KE Γ> ). In the 
exceptional case, the substitution effect dominates the adverse output effect ( 0
jj KE Γ<  
and  0
jj KE Γ< ). The normal case gives a negative tax shifting effect. The exceptional case 
leads to a positive tax shifting effect. 
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      We return to Table 3. Equation (III.1) shows that a regional tax reform does not 
affect the private dividend if the initial regional taxes on labour and capital are zero. In 
the normal case with initial positive taxes, the tax reform negatively affects the private 
welfare. The higher the initial taxes, the more the private dividend suffers from the tax 
reform. In the exceptional case ( 0
ii EK Γ p ), the private dividend improves when the effect 
of 
jj E K Γ  dominates the effect of 
jj E E Γ .  
    Equation (III.3) shows that, typically, the tax reform improves the environmental 
quality. Only if 
jj E K Γ  dominates 
jj E E Γ  in the exceptional case, the environment 
deteriorates after an environmental reform. The first and second column of Table 5 
show that there is (almost) no scope
4 for a double dividend in the reforming region as 
private welfare and environmental welfare have an opposite sign. 
    In the normal case, the federal budget (eq. (III.6)) unambiguously decreases after a 
tax reform. The tax reform decreases welfare in the non-reforming regions. The 
reforming region exports a part of its non-environmental efficiency costs to the other Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      12
regions. In the exceptional case, the federal budget may increase or decrease, depending 
on general equilibrium elasticities and initial regional and federal taxes. 
Table 5: Welfare effects in region j reducing   
L
j T  or reducing   
K
j T  
4.2.  Reducing capital taxes 
Table 6 shows that the reduced-form coefficients consist of two general equilibrium 
elasticities: 
jj jj E EK E Γ− Γand 
jj jj K KE K Γ− Γ. Table 4 explains the general equilibrium 
elasticities. Table 5 summarizes the welfare effects of Table 6. 
      In Table 4, equation (IV.6) shows that 
jj jj E EK E Γ −Γ  measures the polluting 
input/labour ratio due to a higher price of the polluting input (
*
ii E E ε ) and a lower price of 
capital (
*
ii E K ε ). 
jj jj E EK E Γ− Γ is positive in the normal case. The tax reform leads to a 
decrease of the polluting input demand. The tax burden effect decreases private welfare. 
In the exceptional case, the regional tax reform increases the pollution/labour ratio. 
Here, the positive output effect dominates the negative substitution effect. De Mooij and 
Bovenberg (1998) explain that this happens when capital is a better substitute for labour 
than pollution. In the exceptional case (i.e.  0
jj jj EE KE Γ −Γ < ) private welfare improves. 
    
jj jj K KE K Γ− Γ (IV.10) reflects the effects of a decrease of capital cost (
*
ii K K ε ) and the 
higher price for the polluting input  (
*
ii K E ε ) on the capital demand relative to the labour 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Only in the very specific case if 
jj E K Γ  dominates 
jj E E Γ  in equation (III.1), but does not dominate in equation (III.3) there is a 
double dividend with a very small improvement of private welfare and environmental quality.  
Reducing   
L
j T  Reducing   
K
j T    
0
ii EE Γ f  (normal) 
0
ii EK Γ f (normal) 
0
ii EE Γ f (normal) 
0
ii EK Γ p (exceptional) 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf  (normal) 
0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf (normal) 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf (normal) 
0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γp (exceptional) 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γp (exceptional) 
0
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demand. In the normal case, 
jj jj K KE K Γ− Γ is positive. The regional tax reform reduces the 
tax burden on capital. This expands the capital tax base and a positive tax shifting effect 
appears. If, however, the polluting input is a much better substitute for labour than 
capital, the regional tax reform shifts the tax burden from the relative inelastic factor 
(capital) towards the elastic factor (pollution). If the negative output effect dominates 
the substitution effect, the capital tax base erodes (i.e.  0
jj jj KK EK Γ− Γp ). A negative tax 
shifting effect appears. 
Table 6: Reduced-form coefficients reducing capital tax:   
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      Table 6 represent the reduced-form coefficients for a capital tax cut. The last three 
columns of Table 5 summarize the welfare effects for the normal case (i.e. 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf  and  0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf )  and  two exceptional cases (i.e. 
0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γp / 0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf and  0
ii ii EE KE Γ −Γ f / 0
ii ii KK EK Γ −Γ p ). The exceptional cases 
for 
jj jj E EK E Γ− Γ and 
jj jj K KE K Γ −Γ  can not coexist.  
    The private welfare does not change if the initial regional capital and pollution 
taxes are equal to zero (eq. (VI.1)).  In the normal case, the tax burden effect 
( 0
ii ii EE KE Γ− Γf ) and the positive tax shifting effect ( 0
ii ii KK EK Γ− Γf ) counteract each 
other. Private welfare may improve. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      14
Equation (VI.3) shows that the environmental quality usually increases. If, however,  
jj jj K KE K Γ− Γ dominates 
jj jj E EK E Γ− Γin equation (VI.3), an environmental decline occurs. A 
double dividend appears when the positive tax shifting effect dominates the tax burden 
effect in equation (VI.1) but not in equation (VI.3). The last two columns of Table 5 
show that a double dividend never appears in the exceptional cases: either the private 
welfare improves at the expense of the environment or a better environment deteriorates 
the private welfare. 
    Equation (VI.6) shows that the effect on the federal budget depends on general 
equilibrium elasticities, initial regional taxes and initial federal taxes. In the normal 
case, the federal budget may increase or decrease. With  0
jj jj EE KE Γ −Γ f  and   
0
jj jj KK EK Γ− Γp  a negative tax externality appears. The reforming region exports partially 
its costs for a cleaner environment to the other regions. It tends to oversupply 
environmental quality. If  0
jj jj EE KE Γ− Γp  and  0
jj jj KK EK Γ −Γ f , then the reforming region 
exports a part of its positive private dividend to the other regions. It tends to allow for 
too much pollution. 
5.  SIMULATIONS 
The simulation illustrate the theoretical results for a small federal state (e.g. Belgium) 
and a big federal state (e.g. United States). We raise after-tax energy
5 prices by 10%. 
We assume that the supply of capital is infinitely elastic. In the real world the supply of 
capital is more elastic in the long run than in the short run.  Therefore, these simulations 
can be interpreted as the long-run consequences of environmental tax reforms. The 
shares, taxes and elasticities correspond roughly to most Western countries (de Mooij 
and Bovenberg, 1998). These economies are characterized by a large share of labour 
income in GDP and large initial labour and capital taxes as compared to energy taxes. 
The labour income tax on a before-tax basis is 50% ( 1
L T = ). The capital income tax on 
a before-tax basis is set at one third for mobile capital ( 0,5
K T = ). 
      The debate on the substitutability/complementarity between capital and energy calls 
for sensitivity analysis on the cross price elasticities of capital and energy demand. 
Therefore we run the model three times. The first run is the basis run (with 
* 0,02
ii KE ε =−  
and 
* 0,04
ii EK ε =− ). In the second run we assume that  i K  and  i E  are better substitutes 
                                                       
5 In the simulation we replace polluting input taxes by energy taxes. Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      15
(with 
* 0,1
ii KE ε =−  and 
* 0,2
ii EK ε =− ) compared to the basis run. The third run assumes that 
i K  and  i E  are poorer substitutes (with 
* 0,06
ii KE ε =  and 
* 0,12
ii EK ε = ). Table 7 and Table 8 
show the results for the labour and capital tax cut under three elasticity scenario’s. 
      In the initial equilibrium, we assume that both the marginal utility of the federal 
local public goods and the marginal utility of environmental quality equal the marginal 















      In this model, Belgium and the United States differ in two aspects. First, we assume 
that Belgium only consists of two identical regions 
6. The US has 50 identical states. We 
consider them as small open economies
7.  Second, in the United States, the lower 
government levels
8 are competent for about half of the total energy taxation. For the 
U.S. we estimate that the state’s tax shares are respectively 20%, 20% and 50% for 
respectively the capital tax, labour tax and pollution tax
9. For Belgium, the regional tax 
shares are 20% for capital and 10% for both labour and pollution
10.  
5.1.  Small federal state: Belgium 
The base run with a labour tax cut (first column Table 7) shows a decline of the energy 
demand in the reforming region by 6,47%. This implies a positive environmental 
dividend. The wages and employment decrease respectively with 0,02% and 0,01%, 
causing a negative non-environmental private dividend. Hence, there is no double 
dividend, consisting of private welfare and public environmental welfare, but rather a 
trade-off between both. Compared to labour, energy seems to be overtaxed from a non-
environmental point of view. Moreover, the federal budget decreases with 0,11%. The 
environmental policy of one region implies a negative tax externality on the other 
region. The welfare in the reforming region increases with 0,54%. This is a trade-off 
between the wage effect, the federal budget and the environmental quality. The other 
region, however, suffers from a negative environmental tax externality and its welfare 
decreases by 0,04%.  
                                                       
6 The two regions in the model are Flanders and Wallonia/Brussels. In real world, Belgium consists of three heterogeneous regions 
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. 
7 Although the United States as a whole are definitely not a small open economy, it is a reasonable assumption to consider most 
states as small open economies. Only four states have a bigger population than 13 million people: California, Florida, New York 
and Texas.  
8 States, provinces, municipalities 
9 US Census Bureau, 2000 
10 Anno 2004 Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      16
      In the case of a capital tax cut (second column in Table 7), pollution decreases by 
5,76% and capital demand is 4,32% higher. Wages and employment increase by 
respectively 0,08% and 0,02%. The positive tax shifting effect dominates the tax burden 
effect and we observe a double dividend. This suggests that in the long run capital is 
typically overtaxed in most Western countries, compared to energy. Moreover, the 
federal budget increases by 0,28%. The tax reform in one region brings about a positive 
vertical tax externality in the other region. Its welfare increases by 0,11%. 
Table 7: Effects of an increase in after-tax energy prices by 10% in Belgium 
Base run 
* 0,02
ii KE ε =−  and 
* 0,04
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  better substitutes 
* 0,1
ii KE ε = −  and 
* 0,2
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  poorer substitutes 
* 0,06
ii KE ε =  and 
* 0,12




i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  
Wage  -0,02 0,08  -0,002  0,10 -0,04 0,06 
Employment  -0,01 0,02  -0,0009  0,02 -0,02 0,01 
Pollution  -6,47 -5,76 -6,46 -6,52 -6,47 -4,98 
Capital  -0,77 4,32 0,04 5,17 -1,57 3,46 
Output  -0,75 0,07 -0,58 0,08 -0,91 0,06 
Federal  Budget -0,11 0,28 -0,05 0,34 -0,18 0,22 
Consumption  -0,01 0,06  -0,001  0,07 -0,02 0,04 
Welfare In region j  0,539  0,658  0,569  0,755  0,509  0,560 
WelfareIn  region  –j  -0,042 0,107 -0,018 0,130 -0,067 0,085 
      The third and fourth columns of Table 7 show the results for a sensitivity analysis 
run where capital and pollution are better substitutes. Substituting energy taxes for 
distorting taxes on labour or capital becomes more favourable from a non-
environmental point of view. For a labour tax cut, the wages, employment and federal 
budget decrease less than in the base run. The easier substitution between capital and 
energy creates a larger substitution effect towards capital. More capital is used after the 
tax reform. In the case of a capital tax cut, wage, employment, capital demand and 
federal budget increase more than in the corresponding base run. The better substitution 
boosts the economy from a non-environmental point of view. 
      Poor substitution between capital and pollution (fifth and sixth column in Table 7)  
exacerbates the drop in wage, employment, capital and federal budget in case of a 
labour tax cut. With a capital tax cut, poor substitution curtails the gain in wage, 
employment, capital and federal budget. The overall welfare in both the reforming and 
the non-reforming region is better off if capital and energy are better substitutes. 
Similarly, their welfare is worse if capital and pollution are poorer substitutes. A better 
substitution of capital and energy favours a regional environmental tax reform, while a Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      17
poorer substitution between capital and energy limits the scope for cheap environmental 
improvement. 
5.2.  Big federal state: United States 
One state raises its after-tax energy prices by 10%. Table 8 shows that the results are 
similar to the results for Belgium. The decrease in pollution is approximately identical. 
In the case of a labour tax cut the regional marginal environmental tax reform 
deteriorates private and federal public non-environmental welfare. A capital tax cut 
boosts environmental quality, private welfare and federal budget. Better substitution 
between capital and pollution favours a cheap improvement of environmental quality. 
Poorer substitution, however, makes the welfare worse. 
      The differences between American and Belgian results are due to two aspects: the 
higher regional share in the overall pollution tax in the US and the number of regions. 
First, a high initial regional environmental tax ratio reinforces the tax burden effect. 
With a labour tax cut, the wage and employment decrease more in the US than in 
Belgium. With a capital tax cut, the tax reform boosts the Belgian wages and 
employment more than the American. Second, as the number of regions is much higher 
in the US, the federal budget is less sensible to regional policy. A regional 
environmental tax reform in the US imposes a lighter vertical tax externality on the non-
reforming states. 
    Curiously, the welfare improvement in the reforming region in the US is higher 
than in Belgium for a labour tax cut. This is due to the fact that the provision of federal 
local public goods decreases relatively less in the US.  This effect outweighs the larger 
tax burden effect. Similarly, for a capital tax cut the welfare increase in the reforming 
region is smaller in the US due to the lower positive vertical tax effect and the larger tax 
burden.  
Table 8: Effects of an increase in after-tax energy prices by 10% for  the US. 
Base run 
* 0,02
ii KE ε =−  
* 0,04
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  better substitutes 
* 0,1
ii KE ε = −  
* 0,2
ii EK ε =−  
/ ii K E  poorer substitutes 
* 0,06
ii KE ε =  
* 0,12
ii EK ε =    
Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  Lower 
L
i T  Lower 
K
i T  
Wage  -0,06 0,05 -0,04 0,06 -0,08 0,04 
Employment  -0,03 0,01 -0,02 0,01 -0,03  0,007 
Pollution  -6,48 -5,74 -6,48 -6,51 -6,49 -4,95 
Capital  -0,78 4,21  0,02 5,06 -1,59 3,37 
Output  -0,76 0,04 -0,60 0,05 -0,93 0,04 
Federal  Budget  -0,004 0,01 -0,002 0,02 -0,007 0,01 
Consumption  -0,04 0,03 -0,03 0,04 -0,05 0,03 
Welfare in region j  0,567  0,543  0,573  0,619  0,560  0,466 
Welfare in regions -j  -0,0015  0,004  -0,0005  0,0052  -0,0025  0,0034 Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      18
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper focuses on how a regional environmental tax reform in a federal state affects 
the welfare of all regions. The federal state consists of a federal and a regional 
government level. Production needs labour, mobile capital and mobile polluting input. 
Each government level finances its budget with taxes on the production factors (i.e. 
respectively federal and regional taxes). The welfare in each region depends on the 
regional environmental quality, the regional and federal public goods and the private 
welfare. We do not account for interregional labour mobility, or for trans-boundary 
welfare effects of the environment or the regional public goods. 
      One region increases its regional pollution tax and recycles the excess tax revenues 
by lowering pre-existing distorting regional labour or capital taxes. As the regional 
environmental tax reform is budget neutral, the level of regional public good does not 
change. The pollution tax increase improves the environmental quality in the reforming 
region. 
      First, the paper shows how the distribution of the tax burden over the two clean 
production factors (capital and labour) affects the efficiency of the regional tax system 
as a revenue-raising device. The tax reform has an impact on the private welfare in the 
tax-reforming region. The paper distinguishes two private welfare effects: the tax 
burden effect and the tax shifting effect. The regional government foregoes tax revenues 
as the tax reform erodes the tax base of the polluting input. This efficiency cost is called 
the tax burden effect. Similarly, the tax reform may erode or expand the capital tax base. 
The regional government gets less or more tax revenues. This is called the (negative or 
positive) tax-shifting effect. The model shows that the economy is more efficient when 
the pre-existing taxes on the most mobile factor are reduced (i.e. capital tax cut) 
compared to the less mobile factor (i.e. labour tax cut).  
      Second, the paper shows how the regional environmental tax reform affects the 
welfare of the non-reforming regions. We do not account for transboundary 
environmental effects. Moreover, the tax reform does not change the private welfare in 
the non-reforming regions. The tax reform, however, changes the tax bases of the 
federal taxes in the reforming region. This influences the federal budget and, hence, the 
welfare in all regions. This welfare effect is called the vertical tax externality. The sign 
and magnitude of the vertical tax externality depends on the tax base changes and the 
federal tax shares. The total welfare in the reforming region is a trade-off between a Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities in a Federal State      19
cleaner environment, the tax burden effect (negative), the tax shifting effect (positive or 
negative) and the vertical tax externality (positive or negative). Only the vertical tax 
externality (positive or negative) affects the welfare in the non-reforming regions. 
      The simulations show that in both Belgium and the US the private welfare, 
employment, capital tax base and federal budget decrease with a regional labour tax cut. 
They increase with a regional capital tax cut. The regional share in the energy taxation 
is higher in the US. Hence, the tax burden effect is stronger in the reforming region. 
Thus, private welfare in the US responds worse to the reform. As the US has more 
states, its vertical tax externality has a relatively lower impact. Both the Belgian and US 
economies react better and more flexible when the mobile factors are good substitutes 
than when they are bad substitutes. 
      Major extensions of this simplified model can be made by allowing transboundary 
pollution and household mobility (both commuting and migration). An interesting topic 
of research is how the federal construction influences the distribution of the burdens of 
alternative instruments across the regions and government levels. Finally, introducing 
the asymmetric information between government levels and regions, will significantly 
influence the environmental policies.  
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